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1 The primary purpose of this book is to discuss the concept of religious luck as linked to
ethical values. The author emphasizes that the quality and interpretation of the luck
factor  can  be  studied  in  a  variety  of  ways,  not  only  in  theology  but  also  in  social
sciences and philosophy. In the first chapter of the book, Axtell defines what he means
by  problems  of  religious  luck.  He  believes  that  the  new  issue  of  religious  luck  is
concerned with asymmetric  trait  attribution in connection with a  broader study of
inductive risk or the epistemic risk of “getting it wrong” in an inductive context. In
other words, the concept of luck appears as a new study of religion. In doing so, he gets
inspiration from many contemporary theologians and pragmatist philosophers such as
William James, Linda Zagzebski, Charlotte Katzoff, Joel Feinberg and Thomas Nagel.
2 The methodological aspects of the problem of religious luck are central in the first
chapter.  For Axtell,  religious luck appears as  a  main factor that  affects  the control
mechanism of  religious  behavior.  Therefore,  he  demonstrates  that  it  would  not  be
appropriate to interpret moral luck – in which luck makes moral differences – as a
phenomenon exclusively philosophical, but it should also be evaluated psychologically.
Hence,  Axtell  gives  us  explanations  from  socio-psychological  studies  according  to
which  the  righteous  judgments  of  people  emerge  from  the  lack  of  knowledge.  He
investigates the relation between religious luck and moral as well as epistemic luck.
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While doing so, he tries to look for an answer to the question whether any concept of
luck  philosophically  should  also  be  valid  and  useful  in  ethics,  epistemology,  and
science.  Separately  from  other  philosophers,  the  author  does  not  discuss  the
functioning of cognitive illusion as refers to the understanding of luck. Thus, on the
following pages, Axtell speaks of the diversity of religious luck.
3 One example of this religious luck would be resultant luck, which is defined as the bad/
good luck of being harmed or benefited in consequence of an act. The second type of
luck, criteria religious luck is defined as suffering harms or enjoying benefits through
being judged or punished. However, while constitutive religious luck, as a different one, is
explained as  religious  analog of  bad/good luck in  being the kind of  person one is,
propositional religious luck is understood as impacting the agent in a malign way when he
or she has good evidence available for a belief, yet does not believe on the basis of the
good available evidence. Axtell continues with veritic religious luck, which is a religious
analog that is associated with epistemology. Finally, he focuses on environmental veritic
religious luck, as a religious analog of the kind of malign epistemic luck that operates in
Fake Barn cases. The assumption is that such luck factors have significant effects not
only on religious teaching but also on human psychology.
4 The  second  part  of  the  book  explains  the  interpretation  of  religion  through  the
philosophy of  science and the role of  risk in determining ethical  and moral  values.
Before examining the second part in detail, it is necessary to state what the philosophy
of science means and how the term risk determines ethical and moral values as well as
human biases. The philosophy of science explains the events that await clarification or
the  secrets  of  nature  using  a  number  of  techniques  such  as  experimentation  and
observation. However, the concept of risk refers, often rather vaguely, to situations in
which it is possible, but not certain, that some undesirable event will occur. In this
sense, it is seen that the concept of risk is uncertain and includes the lack of knowledge.
Therefore, differences in religious beliefs, according to Axtell, appear as the result of an
epistemological problem. In other words, how and why one knows certain things is an
epistemological problem rather than religious.
5 The philosopher understands that epistemology explains how perception or beliefs can
give us information or justified faith about the external world, about the things that are
outside of us, such as the belief in a god and religion. The culturally nurtured faith
shows the influence of social norms on the belief system of a community. Especially,
inductive thinking and epistemic risk have shown the importance of epistemological
problem by comparing it with spiritual salvation, values, and beliefs. 
6 On the other hand, the author addresses the philosophy of science and explains the
disagreements  between  religious  norms  by  using  the  inductive  risk,  which is  the
chance  or  possibility  of  getting  it  wrong  in  an  inductive  context.  He  accepts  that
inductive  risk  can  be  an  essential  basis  for  discussions  between  philosophers  and
theologians. Axtell is convinced that social norms and values must be considered to
reach a clear understanding of  the concept of  truth.  He emphasizes that scientists,
philosophers,  and  theologians  must  make  a  value  judgment  while  choosing  the
standards of evidence which they need for accepting or rejecting a given hypothesis.
Although  it  is  unquestionable  that  values  can  affect  many  aspects  of  science,  the
inductive risk argument goes further,  showing that even the evaluation of  theories
should contain some reference to values and valuations.
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7 Another critical point in the second chapter consists of the four crucial theses of the
new problem of religion. The first issue is familial-cultural displacement symmetry, which
is  more about  the identity  of  an adherent  of  religion and it  focuses  on family  and
culture. The second problem is etiological symmetry. This thesis tries to explain how one
becomes  religious  under  the  influence  of  the  epistemic  locations  and  purported
revelations. In other words, the religion or a sect-based belief that an individual has
acquired is mostly due to the reason that one witnesses the rituals and practices of the
given belief. The third thesis refers to exclusivist asymmetries, the belief of people that is
shaped according to the epistemic location. In other words, people believe that their
religion  is  accurate  and  that  those  who  believe  in  another  faith  are  wrong.  Axtell
continues, “The exclusivist ascribes falsehood to the theological systems of religious
aliens, but true to their own, through what any non-committed party would judge to be
a common mode of belief uptake: testimonial authority assumption” (p. 59). As the last
point, counter-inductive thinking demonstrates how the mindset of religious exclusivism
is  enabled  only  through  counter-inductive  thinking.  It  is  a  measure  that  calls
something into question by producing an anti-thesis against it.
8 The third chapter of the book focuses on the types of fideism, such as psychological and
religious. According to Axtell, psychological fideism is an explanatory thesis and one
that can be tested and continually revised.  By explaining so,  the main focus of  the
philosopher  is  the  religious  fundamentalism,  a  type of  belief  system which enables
individuals to make sense of their lives and provides them with an identity. Axtell gives
an understanding of  religious radicalization through the theory that  he takes from
Whitehouse  and  McQuinn  who  coined  the  term  DMR  (Divergent  Modes  of  Religiosity, 
2013). DMR highlights that the more severe or risky the requirements for entry into a
group identity are, the higher emotional connection appears with the group members.
It  is  designed  to  explain  how  religion  was  created,  the  way  it  is  transferred  from
generation  to  generation  and  its  evolution  over  time.  The  theory  emphasizes  the
combination  of  beliefs  in  two  different  categories  according  to  the  structure  of
religions  or,  in  other  words,  it  suggests that  religions  tend  to  unite  around  two
different modes, namely imaginary and doctrinal. The imaginary mode is characterized
by high arousal rituals,  which are rarely performed, and are associated with small-
scale, specific religious groups. In contrast, the doctrinal method is usually defined by
low stimulation rituals and is associated with larger inclusive communities as in large
world communities.
9 Taking this theory into consideration, Axtell emphasizes that religious fundamentalism
is not only as what to believe but also how to have a faith. Hence, the author refers to
the psychological and social effects of religious norms on the individual. By developing
this type of assertion, he makes a commentary on Abrahamic religions such as Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. In doing so, the philosopher benefits from the researches that
have  been  done  by  Jose  Light  and  Sarah  Savage,  who  take  a  sensible  approach  to
establish  scales  that  support  a  cross-cultural  or  comparative  studies  of
fundamentalism, which shows itself differently in every religion. Some religious values
or features indicate fundamentalism. For example, for Axtell, the salvific exclusivism,
which states that one religion has the correct version of god, truth, and salvation, is
one of the characteristics of fundamentalism. 
10 Axtell  believes that  the psychological  effect  of  religious teachings and its  influence
cause significant elements of extremism. His Jamesian philosophy influences his efforts
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to connect the psychology of religion and philosophy of science. In The Will to Believe,
American psychologist and philosopher William James, defines religion as a tendency
in  which  philosophy  of  science  can  take  advantage.  James  believed  that  the
psychological dynamics, such as norms, characteristics, and values are involved in the
nature  of  human  agents.  Such  a  psychological  understanding  of  religion  is  called
descriptive fideism; therefore, James’s term faith-ladder is illustrated as an expressive of
psychological fideism. According to James, anything proposed to one’s faith is called a
hypothesis,  and  within  the  scope  of  interpretation,  there  are  options.  To  really
understand  James,  we  need  to  understand the  terms  he  defines  or  introduces.  A
hypothesis  is  a  suggestion or an idea.  It  exists  because it  is  seen as  a  possible  and
acceptable belief. Such hypothesis can be divided into two categories. A live hypothesis,
which is actually a proposition in which we can believe and a dead hypothesis, which is
a proposition that we cannot believe. In light of this, James introduces the theory of
option.  In  his  characterization,  decision  between  two  hypotheses  is  an  option.
Therefore, there are several kinds of options. For example, (1) a live or a dead option,
(2) forced option, and (3) momentous option. 
11 Thus,  the Jamesian faith-ladder  crosses  division between philosophers  as  long as  it
consists of “is” and “ought.” 
12 Axtell indicates that risk and responsibility are intimately connected. He says, “The
riskiness of one’s method of forming one’s religious belief is central not just to critical
concerns in the psychology of religion, but also normative concerns with the ethics of
belief”  (92).  To  sum up,  the  primary  point  that  chapter  three  indicates  is  the  link
between  counter-inductive  thinking  and  religious  fundamentalism.  To  put  it
differently, the third chapter analyzes how the philosophy of science and psychology of
religion act to understand religious radicalization. 
13 In the fourth chapter, the author emphasizes the role of biases that create differences
among religions.  Especially,  psychological  and philosophical  effects  of  in-group and
out-group separation. The concept of prejudice is explained more psychologically, thus,
the theory bias blind spot which shows the impact of the biases on the decisions that
people  make  for  others,  is  emphasized.  The  author  gives  examples  from  French
philosopher Michel de Montaigne as he discusses biases. In Montaigne, the judgments
that people make in ignorance of their preferences are called importunate presumption.
Montaigne  most  often  associated  errors  with  some  form  of  presumption.  So,  he
categorized these errors with two kinds of hypotheses; the first error is the failure to be
open to the unfamiliar and the second presumption is the error of not coming back to
ourselves,  to  the  most  familiar  one.  Hence,  for  Axtell,  our  biases  are  the  essential
elements that drive mentality of a religious holder into fundamentalism. As he points
out, “Our bias blind spot and our tendency to engage in doubtful, sharply asymmetrical
characterological  trait-ascription are intimately connected’’  (113).  The psychological
study  of  bias  takes  attraction  as  one  of  the  explanatory  notes  for  sociologists  and
psychologists.  For  instance,  Christina  Cleveland,  an  American  social  psychologist,
points out that when social preferences, such as out-group and in-group, take place in
any sphere of life, the tendency to classify people and exaggerate differences became
more frequent and visible.  Another psychologist,  Tricia  Yurak,  explains bias in two
different terms. One of the theses is false consensus effect which demonstrates a kind of
bias that ordinary people create in their mind. She names such bias cognitive bias. False
consensus effect appears when people realize that others are more similar to them. The
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second thesis is pluralistic ignorance which, according to Yurak, refers to instances of
actual  similarity  interpreted  as  dissimilarity.  Taking  psychological  research  into
consideration,  Axtell  combines  them  with  counter-inductive  thinking and  refers  to
another  philosophical  book  entitled  Confabulation,  written  by  William  Hirstein,  an
American philosopher of mind. Hirstein writes, “Confabulation involves the absence of
doubt about something one should doubt: one’s memory, one’s ability to move one’s
arm, one’s ability to see, and so forth” (116).
14 After taking an in-depth look of biases, the second part of the fourth chapter analyzes
fundamentalists’  thinking  rather  than  their  belief.  By  doing  so,  the  author  gives
examples  from  the  other  studies  that  have  been  done  by  James  Peacock  and  Tim
Pettyjohn,  who  claimed  that  narratives  are  useful  analytical  windows  into
fundamentalist religious traditions. As a result, the writer believes that social biases
can  be  a  strategy  of  self-exculpating  while  they  are  most  of  the  time  motivated
religiously.
15 The next chapter of the book covers religious teaching. The fifth chapter addresses the
relationship between belief, which is a dogmatic and knowledge, which is doxastic. The
writer refers to dogmatic belief as an undetermined idea while doxastic means over-
determined. By giving various definitions of fideism, the author credits the diversity of
a conception of faith. In other words, the interpretation of faith conquers an essential
place in the new problems of religious luck.  At the same time, Axtell  mentions the
importance  of  parity  arguments and  its  link  with  naive  realism while  he  gives  us  a
symmetrical and asymmetrical outlook not only in the philosophy of religion but also
in epistemology. Thus, he emphasizes that deism and theism provide the first example
of parity arguments.
16 Consequently, the last chapter of the book focuses on counter-inductive thinking, counter-
intuitive ideas, and the cognitive science of religion. The author emphasizes the cognitive
science  of  religion (CSR),  which  is  a  psychological  and  evolutionary  approach to  the
religious faith, behavior and rituals. CSR is a scientific study of religion and it focuses
on the methods and theory from a very broad range of disciplines including: cognitive
psychology,  evolutionary  psychology,  and  cognitive  anthropology.  Specifically,  CSR
explores  the  cause-effect  relationship  among  religious  events,  considerations,  and
practices among people. It mainly focuses on how ordinary human psychology reacts to
religious phenomena. What Axtell does, is a try of combination between psychology
and  philosophy:  “My  point  is  that  only  by  more  closely  aligning  philosophical
normativity  with  psychological  study  can  we  hope  to  improve  real-world  critical
thinking, as is crucially necessary to address many problems that we face” (205), as he
puts it. Regarding the aligning of rational normativity and psychological studies, Axtell
describes  Olli-Pekka  Vainio’s  recent  book,  Disagreeing  Virtuously:  Religious  Conflict  in
Interdisciplinary  Perspective, where  Vainio  underlines  the  concept  of  disagreement
among religious holders. As a conclusion, chapter six goes into CSR and its relation to
the philosophy of religion while the luck factor and the concept of risk allow us to find
out  the  connections  between  counter-inductive  fideism and  counter-intuitive  ideas of
popular religiosity.
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